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Résumé : Je défends ici la nécessité, et ébauche une première version, d’une
théorie iconique des propositions. Selon celle-ci, les propositions sont comme
les objets de représentation, ou similaires à eux. Les propositions, suivant
cette approche, sont des propriétés que l’esprit instancie lorsqu’il modélise le
monde. Je connecte cette théorie aux récents développements de la littérature
académique sur les propositions, ainsi qu’à une branche de recherches en
sciences cognitives, qui explique certains types de représentations mentales
en termes d’iconicité.
Abstract: I motivate the need for, and then sketch, an iconic theory of
propositions according to which propositions are like or similar to their
objects of representation. Propositions on this theory are properties that the
mind instantiates when it models the world. I connect the theory to recent
developments in the propositions literature as well as to a strain of cognitive
science that explains some kinds of mental representation in terms of iconicity.
1 Introduction
According to Jeffrey King’s1 and Scott Soames’2 recent theories of proposi-
tions, mental representation is fundamental and propositional representation
is derivative. The traditional view has things the other way around. Call
the recent shift the mind-first (M1) movement and the traditional view the
Philosophia Scientiæ, 24(2), 2020, 99–123.
1. See [King 2007] for a book-length treatment and his papers in [King, Soames
et al. 2014] for further developments in his theory.
2. See [Soames 2010] for the initial presentation of his theory. See [Soames 2015]
for a more recent book-length treatment as well as his papers in [King, Soames et al.
2014].
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proposition-first (P1) movement.3 According to M1 theories, the existence
and nature of propositions somehow depend upon the mental processes that
give rise to mental, and thus propositional, representation. In this paper,
I accept, for the sake of exploring its consequences, the M1 movement. If this
assumption is true, it opens the door to the possibility that the mind represents
in different ways, which may give rise to different kinds of propositions.
In particular, I consider the idea in some areas of cognitive science that
some mental representation is iconic. Here, I have in mind views according
to which the mind represents the world by creating simulations, models, and
maps of it. Taking these empirical views together with the M1 movement,
I sketch a view of iconic propositions. To be clear about my commitments, in
this paper, I provisionally accept the M1 movement and the cognitive science
according to which the mind represents partially iconically and argue for, on
the basis of these provisional acceptances, a sketch of iconic propositions.4
I say “sketch” here because crafting such a theory will require numerous
controversial choices that, for reasons of space, will remain un-argued for.
The overarching purpose of this paper is to provide an argument for the need
for a theory of iconic propositions given the provisional assumptions and to
provide a recipe template for creating such a theory—and then to provide one
concrete sketch.
Given the diversity of the literature on iconic representation, I also want
to be clear about the scope of this paper. There are at least three conspicuous
literatures on iconic representation:
(1) The literature on depiction in aesthetics.
(2) The literature on scientific modeling, diagrams, and scientific
representation generally in the philosophy of science.5
(3) The literature on iconic content vehicles in cognitive science.
We’ll call my project—of characterizing iconic propositions in an M1 context—
IP. IP differs from, and is similar to, (1)–(3). (1) and (2) concern the
question of how we use entities external to the mind (pictures, models, e.g.) to
represent the world while IP doesn’t concern such entities external to the mind.
According to the mental processes that I base IP on, “we” don’t interpret our
3. In this paper, I focus on the work of King and Soames as representative
M1 theories. One can find another paradigm M1 theory in the work of Peter Hanks,
a theory closer to Soames’ than King’s. For a book-length treatment, see [Hanks
2015].
4. A web of words and phrases in this area express related ideas: “proposition”,
“content”, maybe even “concept”, etc. The reason that I’m choosing the word
“proposition” in particular is because I am self-consciously working within the
M1 framework in a way similar to King but for a different kind of mental
representation—see §2.2 below for my claim that I’m working in a style similar to
King.
5. Sometimes maps can go under (1) or (2). Some of the work of John Kulvicki
could fall under (1) and (2). See for example [Kulvicki 2013].
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own representations (I say more about this below). For (1) and (2), there is
a plausible desideratum that a theory should make sense of the multiplicity of
representational formats—i.e., the vastness of different kinds of pictures and
models. IP doesn’t share this desideratum since biology will severely limit the
mental formats that undergird IP. (2) and IP share something in common that
isn’t present in the picture-focused sub-literature of (1): A key desideratum
for IP is that iconic propositions must guide us in our action in virtue of our
ability to reason about the icon’s target via reasoning about the icon. This
constraint—what Frigg & Nguyen call the surrogative reasoning requirement
[Frigg & Nguyen 2016, §1]—is familiar in the modeling sub-literature of (2).
Finally, IP and (3) are closely linked and best understood by analogy with
King’s theory. His propositions are abstract objects gleaned from the mental
processes responsible for calculating linguistic meaning. Iconic propositions
are abstract objects gleaned from the mental processes responsible for creating
mental maps and models. In §2, I make the case for the need for iconic
propositions on the basis of the aforesaid assumptions and argue that they
are different kinds of propositions rather than merely different mental formats
that express garden variety propositions. Because of the limited scope of this
paper, I don’t discuss some of the greatest hits of iconic representation, such
as the works of C.S. Peirce or Tractatus-era Wittgenstein.
In §3, I present my theory sketch of iconic propositions according to which
such propositions are properties, and representation is analyzed in terms of
the co-instantiation of properties. Numerous questions will then have to be
answered: What makes an iconic proposition representational in any sense?
What makes an iconic proposition about whatever it’s about? When does an
iconic proposition accurately characterize its target? Are iconic propositions
holistic or atomic? I will answer these questions to form the sketch. To fill out
the theory, for the reset of the paper, I consider various propositional issues
vis-à-vis the theory.
2 From M1 to iconic propositions
I first characterize M1 and P1 and then argue that M1 creates a need for iconic
propositions. I then argue that these are a different kind of proposition.
2.1 General character of each thesis
Schiffer captures how philosophers have traditionally understood propositions
[Schiffer 2003]. According to this view, propositions are abstract objects
that have truth conditions essentially and absolutely—i.e., respectively, it’s
necessarily true that a proposition has its particular truth conditions, and
a proposition has those truth conditions without relativization. Contrast
that essentiality and absoluteness with sentences: It’s contingently true that
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sentences have their particular truth conditions, and they have their truth
conditions only relative to a given language with its various conventions.
Though Schiffer doesn’t use this language, traditionally, propositions rep-
resent, or have their truth conditions, intrinsically—i.e., they represent the
world purely in virtue of the way the proposition is. Any duplicate of a
proposition will represent like the original copy. Last, propositions are mind-
and language-independent in two senses. First, their existence doesn’t depend
on humans or agents of any kind. Second, multiple languages can express the
same proposition, but any one proposition doesn’t belong to a given language.
Quintessential P1 theories include the possible worlds theory of propositions,
according to which the proposition that p is the set of worlds where p is the case
(or the characteristic function of that set); and the tuple theory of proposition,
according to which the proposition that, e.g., Rachel reads, comprises an entity
having to do with Rachel and something to do with the property of reading,
and the proposition is structured in some way related to the syntax of the
sentence “Rachel reads”, something like the following:
〈R, r〉 .
The kinds of entities involved in the tuple will depend on the theorist’s
semantic and metaphysical commitments, whether Russellian or Fregean.
The important aspect of this traditional picture is the mind-independent
bit. As noted, with the work of King and Soames, the recent propositions
literature has taken an empirical turn in which the nature and existence of
propositions is in some way mind dependent. To start, we can understand this
turn to mind dependence in terms of whether propositional representation
is derivative or fundamental. Some things represent because we confer that
power upon those things. The sentences on this page represent in virtue
of various conventions set up regarding written language. Thus we humans
partially conferred representational properties on written language. But what
about our human representational capacities? Are we the ultimate wellspring
of representation, or do our mental states represent derivatively because
they express propositions which themselves are the ultimate wellsprings of
representation? Note that this question is distinct from the question of whether
propositional representation is intrinsic or extrinsic. The source of a property
and whether an object has that property intrinsically are different issues.
M1 rejects the fundamentality of propositional representation. For
reasons of space, I will assume some familiarity with the works of King and
Soames, whom I count as the two key mind-first theorists. Both reject the
fundamentality of propositional representation and perhaps see the rejection
as the key innovation of their views. King’s propositions are syntactic-semantic
facts that inherit their representational capacity from the mind, in particular
that these facts encode the instantiation function, which they inherit from our
minds. Soames’ propositions are act types the tokens of which involve mental
actions, such as predication, and the representational capacity of these acts
derive from these mental actions.
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The distinction between the basis of content and propositions may
help illuminate how I think of King’s theory as well as the theory sketch
I present below.6 Herein content will refer to mental representations and
propositions to related abstract entities that a theorist alleges to play various
propositional roles. For example, for King, content consists in the mental
representations involved in syntax and semantics, and his propositions are
syntactic-semantic facts. Content for me will be iconic mental representations
and the related propositions, as we’ll see below, will be properties. The
basis of content is whatever mechanism is responsible for some certain kind of
mental representation. One of the brain’s functions is to provide information,
and thus there is a mechanism that discharges this function: the brain’s
activity somehow creates an inner representation, a vehicle for content, that
expresses some proposition. To have an attitude in a proposition consists in
the following, where r is a content vehicle, S is an agent, Att is a propositional
attitude, and p is a proposition:
(4) ∃r(S Att r & r expresses p).
For S to have an attitude whose object is p is to bear a relation, functionally
defined as a given attitude, to an inner content vehicle whose content is p.
For the language of thought theory, the content vehicle will be a sentence
of mentalease. For a model/map theory, the content vehicle will be some
inner model/map. King and I will pay greater attention to r and especially
the process that gives rise to r when crafting the theory of p in the second
conjunct. Conversely, a P1 theorist can craft a theory of p while ignoring some
facts about the mechanism by which the brain carries out its representational
function. If the M1 theorist doesn’t have good reasons to show that the mind
in fact represents the way she claims, then we have no reason to accept the
existence of the abstract objects, i.e., her propositions. The propositions-first
theorist doesn’t face such a dependency.
Since I will be referring back to the mind- and proposition-first views
repeatedly, let’s set off and define each:7
Proposition-First (P1) The thesis that propositions exist, and have their
nature, independently of minds, and propositions are the ultimate source
of representation while mental representation is derivative.
Mind-First (M1) The thesis that propositions depend for their existence
and nature on the mind, and minds are the ultimate source of
representation while propositional representation is derivative.
2.2 From M1 to iconic propositions
The purpose of this subsection is to argue for the conclusion that if one
accepts the M1 framework, and if one accepts a rich system of iconic mental
6. See [McGinn 1989, 182] for the distinction.
7. These definitions are from [Fitts Forthcoming].
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representation (specified in §3.1 below), then that motivates the project of the
next section—to sketch a theory of iconic propositions. The project, however,
will be limited in scope: it will be a sketch of a theory of propositions for a
particular mental representational format. A natural worry for this approach
is that different mental representational formats shouldn’t require different
kinds of propositions in much the same way that different languages don’t
require different kinds of propositions. The benefit of the limited approach is
that it has the potential to avoid the Benacerraf problem.
If we accept M1, as we provisionally do for this paper, then we commit
to propositions that depend on some etiology that is responsible in the end
for some kind of human representation. If the M1 theorist is wrong about the
etiology that is responsible for her content, then we can call into question
her theory of propositions. If mainstream formal semantics is seriously
mistaken in the way that we calculate semantic content, then King’s theory
may be in trouble. But even if the M1 theorist is right about the ground-
level processes that are responsible for the content on which she bases her
theory, it’s important to see the scope of such a theory. An M1 theory
will be a theory of that kind of content—the kind that a given mental process
is responsible for.
King recognizes this point. King wrestled with the worry of the origins of
his propositions: to explain how our ancestors first brought Kingean content
into the world [King 2007, chap. 3]. To explain, e.g., how lexical items came
to have semantic values, it seems we would have to appeal to our ancestors’
beliefs and desires, so propositions would need to exist in the first place. In
his book, King sketches a quick story about how our pre-linguistic ancestors
had “proto” intentional states before the dawn of propositions. Later, King
says a bit more about these proto-intentional states, that they may have been
perceptual states that had their own kind of content, which is different from
linguistic content [King 2014, 60]. He thus recognizes that the etiology that
produces his content should limit the scope of his theory: His book, as he
says, should have been titled The Nature and Structure of Linguistic Content
instead of just content [King 2014, fn. 19]. He then goes on to say the following:
I believe that many things have content other than sentences of
natural languages. Maps, diagrams, perhaps pictures and, most
importantly for present purposes, perceptual experiences have
contents. In the case of each sort of thing that has content, there
will be an account of those contents in the spirit of the present
account of the contents of natural language sentences. Due to
limitations of space, time and knowledge, the details of the theory
of the contents of perceptual experiences that is in the spirit of the
present account of contents of natural language sentences cannot
be sketched here. [King 2014, fn. 19]
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This is exactly what I’m beginning to do in this paper: I’m trying to give
an account of propositions, in the spirit of King’s, based on a certain kind of
mental content that we have reason to believe may not be linguistic in nature.8
M1 theories, then, have a built-in limitation: Such theories provide content
for a certain kind of mental state. It may turn out that, as an empirical fact,
that all content arises from the same process, but I think it’s likely that we’ll
find that humans represent multi-modally. The takeaway from this discussion
is that M1 theories, depending on how the empirical facts end up, may result
in a kind of pluralism: We may need an M1 theory for linguistic content
which may not, as King recognizes, carry over to other kinds of content.
Pluralism about propositions is woefully under-discussed.9 If pluralism has
been raised at all, it has been in terms of propositional roles that may conflict.
I suggest that if M1 is true, a pluralism of a different kind arises—a pluralism
of etiologies that give rise to different kinds of contents and so different
kinds of propositions.
If this is where the M1 movement has gotten us—basing propositions on
mechanisms that give rise to content and possibly forcing us to countenance
different kinds of propositions for different mechanisms—then maybe the move-
ment is mistaken. Aren’t propositions supposed to capture the information
that different sentences, languages, and representational formats, including
different mental representational formats, express? If this is the case, then
we shouldn’t end up with different kinds of propositions but different mental
formats that express the same kind of proposition.
One of the main motivations for M1 is the possibility of solving the
Benacerraf identification problem in the context of propositions—call this
simply the Benacerraf problem.10 For the possible worlds theory, it’s hard
to see what evidence would favor the set version versus the function version of
the theory, yet both versions perform the same at satisfying (or not satisfying)
whatever propositional roles they’re supposed to, and the different versions are
not, ontologically, the same class of entities. I.e., the set of worlds where snow
is white is not ontologically equivalent to the function that maps white-snow
worlds to truth and non-white-snow worlds to falsity. Likewise for the tuple
theory: it’s hard to see what evidence would favor, for the proposition that
8. See also Tyler Burge’s work on iconic content, e.g., [Burge 2010a] and [Burge
2010b], especially the latter. I emphasize “content”, because Burge would likely
classify the iconic base that I discuss below as “intermodal, non-propositional
cognitive capacities” [Burge 2010b, 47]. For my reasons for using “proposition”,
please refer back to fn. 4. I thank an anonymous reviewer for these references.
9. I want to stress here that the pluralism is about propositions, which is woefully
under-discussed, and not representational formats. There is plenty of work on
pluralism regarding representational formats: linguistic, perceptual, cartographic,
etc.
10. The problem originates in [Benacerraf 1965]. See [Fitts Forthcoming], which
covers the material on the Benacerraf problem in a propositional context in more
detail.
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Rachel reads, 〈R, r〉 over 〈r, R〉, yet both perform equally well by the tuple
theorist’s own lights, and again, they’re not, ontologically, the same entities.
As we’ve seen, the key feature of M1 is the introduction of an empirical
element into propositional theorizing. There are two main, related motivations
for this. First, both King and Soames have argued, or perhaps recognized, that
it’s hard to see how traditional P1 propositions, e.g., set theoretic propositions,
intrinsically represent. Why does the function that maps white-snow worlds
to T and non-white-snow worlds to F intrinsically represent snow as white?
That function seems to represent only in virtue of our interpretation. To see
this, we could easily swap out T and F with 1 and 0 or a fish and a bird—
it doesn’t really matter what so long as we have two distinct entities. Or
why does the set of white-snow worlds intrinsically represent snow as being
white while the set containing some random assortment of things not? The
answer, again, seems the same: we interpret the former set as representing the
proposition that snow is white.
That we need to interpret these propositions in order for them to represent
results in formally equivalent propositional candidates that no possible
evidence could discern among—i.e., the Benacerraf problem. This scenario
is very similar to the classic Benacerraf identification problem concerning set-
theoretic reductions of numbers. In such purely metaphysical situations, as
Clarke-Doane notes, our concepts resolve indeterminacies, and in many such
situations, our concepts don’t discriminate among various competitors [Clarke-
Doane 2013, 472]. In the empirical realm, however, Clarke-Doane notes that
causal chains help to resolve indeterminacy in that they help fix the extensions
of empirical concepts—water, electron, etc. When such casual chains give
out, we end up in a situation that is common in science, especially scientific
modeling: brain and behavioral facts, e.g., might metaphysically (not merely
epistemically) underdetermine whether, say, all syntax is binary branching or is
sometimes n-ary branching. Thus if King ends up with multiple propositional
candidates vying to be identified with the proposition p, and the empirical
facts don’t discriminate among the candidates, then he ends up in a common,
benign situation that empirical investigators can end up in.
Now what if we decide to say that, supposing the brain represents multi-
modally, those modes are merely different formats that encode the same
information, and we understand this common informational content with some
abstract objects qua propositions. The worry here is that our freedom to
stipulate that information removes us from a situation in which causal chains
resolve indeterminacies and where their irresolution is benign. For example,
in the depiction case, some have expressed sympathy for the claim [e.g.,
Grzankowski 2015, 152], that pictures express possible-worlds propositions.
This is a plausible suggestion since iconic and linguistic mental representations
have radically different syntax. Why not say that both linguistic mental
representations and iconic mental representations both express possible worlds
propositions? The problem, though, is, which version? The set version or the
function version? Here we face the Benacerraf problem that moving to M1 was
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supposed to eliminate. I won’t pretend that this worry is unanswerable, but
I present it as a reason to think that M1 leads us to the view that multi-modal
representation leads to different kinds of propositions, to a kind of pluralism,
and not merely multiple formats that express the same kind of proposition.
3 Iconic propositions: The theory sketch
To sketch an M1 theory based on an iconic basis of content, we first need to
get clear on just what that basis is, which I consider in the next subsection.
In the following subsection, I state the theory template and theory sketch and
then consider the theory sketch in relation to various propositional issues.
3.1 The iconic base
The literature on iconic mental representation, in philosophy, psychology,
and elsewhere, is vast, and I don’t intend to provide any kind of thorough
survey here. The idea starts in philosophy with Aristotle and runs through
Aquinas and Hume,11 and in the modern era runs through F.P. Ramsey.12 In
the contemporary literature, Fodor and others have defended the view that
perceptual content is iconic [Fodor 2007]. Heck proposes mental maps as
one among other examples of non-conceptual content, which humans employ
in cognition, along with conceptual content [Heck 2007]. Braddon-Mitchell
& Jackson offer mental maps as an alternative to the language of thought,
and so seem to claim that thought in general occurs in a map-like medium
[Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson 2007, chap. 10], and Armstrong presents a
similarly holistic view of map-like mental representations [Armstrong 1973].
The representations in some computational theories of cognition, e.g., the s-
representations from [Cummins 1989], are iconic and provide an alternative to
the language-like representations of the standard interpretations.
In psychology, mental models are the dominant iconic paradigm.13
According to the mental models perspective, humans and other organisms
represent reality by simulating it with models and by manipulating those
models. Properly understanding the mental models perspective will forestall
a possible confusion. If we were to understand a mental model of a library, we
wouldn’t have an egocentric, two-dimensional internal picture of the library.
As Johnson-Laird notes, mental models are akin to the non-ego-centric three-
dimensional spacial arrays in computer storage [Johnson-Laird 2006, 28]. We
would construct such a picture from a mental model, similar to the way
a computer employs a three-dimensional array, analogous here to a mental
11. See [Jacobson 2013] for historical views of iconic representation.
12. See [Ramsey 1931] for the “belief is a map by which we steer” quote.
13. The idea starts with [Craik 1967], and Phillip Johnson-Laird is perhaps the
biggest contemporary proponent.
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model, to project a two-dimensional picture on a screen. With this small
sampling of iconic representation, let’s discuss iconic representation in general
as a base for iconic propositions.
To motivate iconic propositions, an iconic basis of content needs to
satisfy certain properties. Structure, in the context of mental representations,
is deployed to make sense of two key desiderata for a theory of mental
representation: productivity and systematicity.14 A system of thought is
productive if there is, in principle, no upper bound to the construction of
novel thoughts and is systematic if there are systematic connections between
the kinds of thoughts thinkers can think. For example, if one can think “John
loves Jane”, then one can think “Jane loves John” or “John loves...” for any
object that you fill in the ellipses with. Philosophers in this area argue that we
must appeal to the structure of thoughts to explain how they are combinatorial
in a way that satisfies productivity and systematicity.
Productivity and systematicity are easy to come by if thinking occurs
in a language-like system—a language of thought (LOT)—with a structure
similar to first-order logic, with the mechanisms of connectives, quantification,
predication, etc. While LOT theorists often speak as if their thesis requires
thought to occur in a medium like first-order logic, the official definitions given
by Fodor only require that thought proceed in a medium that has a syntactic
structure and compositional semantics.15 What I want to note here is that
various philosophers have argued that certain iconic content is structured,
systematic, and productive, which is my main concern and that, as such, that
content qualifies as a kind of language of thought in a weak sense.
Let’s see what notion of structure may be relevant to iconic content.
Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson claim that a content is structured if the simi-
larities and differences of content are systematically related to the similarities
and differences of the objects of the content [Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson
2007, 178]. If we have representations R1, R2, ...Rn that correspond to states
of the world W1, W2, ...Wn, differences in the W s will correspond to differences
in Rs. The level at which we find this correspondence may be highly
abstract. To use an example from Braddon-Michell and Jackson, Arabic
numerals are structured representations, the objects of which are numbers
since there is a systematic correspondence between the similarities and
differences of the Arabic numerals and their number objects. The idea
when applied to iconic contents is that there will be systematic differences
and similarities in iconic representations that correspond to similarities and
differences among their objects.
14. This notion differs slightly from the propositional context in which a proposition
is structured if it comprises semantically significant parts.
15. I found a distinction between strong and weak sententiality that I’m working
from here in [Rescorla 2009, 397]—strong sententiality requiring first-order logic like
structure, and weak requiring only syntax and combinatorial structure. Resorla notes
that the official definition of mentalease from [Fodor 1987, 134–138] only requires the
weak sense. Also see [Camp 2007, 152].
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Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson, Camp, and Rescola all argue, in different
ways, that iconic representation can proceed in a medium that is combinatorial,
systematic, and productive [Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson 2007, 181–182],
[Camp 2007, 152–154], [Rescorla 2009, §7]. The specifics of the arguments
for those properties will depend on the details of the iconic representational
system, and here I merely want to mention how this might work. Braddon-
Mitchell & Jackson and Camp both focus on maps in the ordinary sense. Both
argue that such maps contain reoccurring, combinable elements. As Camp
puts it, mental maps are made up of “recurrent formal elements that make
a common semantic contribution each time they occur” [Camp 2007, 154].
There is no upper limit to recombining these elements—satisfying productivity.
What’s more, if one can entertain one combination of locations and relations
among them, one can entertain those elements in a nearby configuration,
satisfying systematicity. The above two philosophers have ordinary maps
as their paradigm, but there are many other formats that iconic content
can take. For example, Rescorla notes, according to one account of a kind
of iconic representation, cognitive systems employ vectors that participate
in computational models that interpret those vectors in terms of Euclidean
distance metrics [Rescorla 2009]. Since these vectors comprise coordinates, an
organism that can entertain a mental map vector composed of a certain set
of coordinates can also entertain another mental map comprising the same
coordinates, swapping one out for another, satisfying systematicity.16
Finally, mental representations—understood broadly as any semantically
evaluable mental state—play different roles, and not every role is suited to
underwrite a theory of propositions. It is common to distinguish three levels
of explanation regarding the mind: the hardware (neural level of the brain),
software (abstract structures that the hardware system realizes to engage
in cognition), and the personal level (conscious experience, beliefs, desires,
etc.).17 The basis of content for a mind-first theory of propositions will be the
software level—the level at which the mind represents that is common enough
among humans to ground a theory of propositions.18 For the purposes of this
16. This point is supposed to illustrate that iconic content can be systematic, but
Rescorla isn’t primarily interested in systematic human mental representations here.
Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson, on the other hand, do claim that all representation
occurs in the medium of mental maps, which they claim are systematic [Braddon-
Mitchell & Jackson 2007].
17. Here I am following the three-part distinction from [McGinn 1989, 185]. This
distinction may also bring to mind the common three-part distinction among the
computational, algorithmic, and implementational levels due to David Marr [see Marr
1982]. I only want to be committal enough to saying that the basis of content in the
theory sketch is sub-personal. See also the next footnote.
18. This is clearly where King grounds his theory, and Soames is less clear on this
issue, though his theory would make the most sense if his mental actions took place
at the software level. For example, Soames often uses perceptual examples—when we
see that a ball is red we predicate redness to a ball. Presumably we don’t consciously
perform such actions.
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paper, any software level iconic content, such as mental maps or models, will
serve as a basis for iconic propositions. Officially, I don’t want to commit
to which cognitive theory best captures the software level of iconic mental
representation, but for reasons of using a single word when I’m not talking
about a specific kind of format, I’ll use “model”.
3.2 Recipe template and sketch
To give an M1 iconic theory of propositions, I answer these questions. Below
each question I state what my answer, for this paper, will be.
Iconic Proposition Recipe Template
(Q1) In virtue of what does an iconic proposition characterize the world
and how, metaphysically, ought we understand that characteriza-
tion?
– Icons characterize the world in virtue of isomorphism. I un-
derstand iconic propositions’ characterization of the world,
metaphysically, in terms of property co-instantiation.
(Q2) Iconic propositions, to be propositions, need to have determinate
content, but how?
– This question is somewhat complicated, but natural teleology
will play a major role.
(Q3) Does a theory prioritize holistic or atomistic propositions? That
is, to characterize an agent’s mental state, do we first characterize
large propositions from which we derive atomistic propositions—
e.g., do we, as a possible worlds theorist might do, first characterize
an agent’s entire mental state in terms of a set of worlds and
then derive the propositions that the agent’s individual thoughts
express; or do we start straight away with the propositions that
individual beliefs express and take the holistic belief state as the
sum of those atoms?
– I prioritize holistic content and employ possible worlds as a
model, in the sense of scientific model, of iconic propositions.
(Q4) How do we understand basic propositional issues, such as logical
relations, accurately and inaccurately characterizing the world,
etc.?
– At the level of ontology, basic propositional issues are under-
stood in terms of property co-instantiation and restrictions
thereof, and the analysis of these issues is cashed out in terms
of possible worlds models in the sense of scientific models.
I’ll answer questions 1-3, then state the theory, and then move to Q4.
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Q1. The thesis that the depiction relation in the aesthetic context consists in
similarity, resemblance, isomorphism, and related notions is by no means un-
challenged [e.g., see Suárez 2003, Greenberg 2013]. Similarity based concepts
are, in my estimation, more popular in the scientific context,19 and there are
sophisticated accounts of surrogative reasoning based on isomorphism, namely
[Swoyer 1991]. Swoyer captures the ideas of isomorphism and surrogative
reasoning here:
[T]he pattern of relations among the constituents of the repre-
sented phenomenon is mirrored by the pattern of relations among
the constituents of the representation itself. And because the
arrangement of things in the representation are like shadows cast
by the things they portray, we can encode information about
the original situation as information about the representation.
Much of this information is preserved in inferences about the
constituents of the representation, so it can be transformed back
into information about the original situation. [Swoyer 1991, 452]
Isomorphism is the first major part of the theory I state below, and
officially, I implicate isomorphism generally in the theory. What I mean
by this is that there are different orders of isomorphism, and, at this point,
I don’t commit to any order or other being the correct order of isomorphism.
I say this because first, cognitive scientists are still actively investigating this
question, and second, different types of orders may capture different modes of
iconic representation. I should note that various authors have chosen second-
order isomorphism as their preferred order. The kind of isomorphism that
Swoyer describes above is second order. The idea is that, while first-order
isomorphism will typically capture the sense in which a representation literally
resembles its object, second-order isomorphism will capture similarity in
abstract relational structure.20
The pattern of relations contained within an iconic representation will be
highly complex, but in order to state the theory, let’s zero in on the complex
property of having that pattern of relations. Entertaining a mental model,
then, will consist in the mind/brain instantiating this complex property, and
successful representation will consist in the co-instantiation of properties—
the mind’s of a pattern of relations and the world’s instantiation of the
complex property of the mirrored pattern of relations. And it is this
mirroring of relational patterns that partially underwrites the usefulness of
these representations.
If we set aside for a moment the niceties of the context of propositions and
the order of isomorphisms and such, the general idea is that a model comprises
19. E.g., see [Weisberg 2013] for a pro-similarity account that eschews isomorphism
among other precisifications of similarity. But see [Suárez 2003] for arguments against
similarity and related concepts.
20. For cognitive scientific literature on the second-order view, see [Shepard &
Chipman 1970] and [Choe 2002].
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a certain pattern of relations—it will be, at the software level and at some level
of abstraction, some way or other. And when the model is useful given some
purpose, the world will be the same way, under isomorphism. And the idea
stays the same when the iconic representation becomes more abstract—e.g.,
with a diagram. But isomorphism is only one part of the sketch because
isomorphism is all too easy to come by. Anything is isomorphic to anything
else under some interpretation. A model doesn’t represent merely because it’s
isomorphic to some aspect of reality. It represents because it has the right
kind of isomorphism to make it useful to us. It is our use to which we put the
model plus its pattern of relations’ being isomorphic to some aspect of reality
that explains how the model comes to represent reality. Surely it cannot be
“we” who interpret our own inner iconic representation on pain of an infinite
regress of inner homunculi.
Q2. The task at hand, then, is to secure a determinate content for an iconic
proposition. Toward that end, I first want to tease apart two questions that
Ramsey separates [Ramsey 2016]. Ramsey considers, on the one hand, what
makes something count as a representation in the first place, and on the other,
what makes that representation have the content that it in fact does. For the
first hand, Ramsey argues that to count as a representation as such, some
state must satisfy a certain kind of role—representation, in other words, is
a functional kind. Thus, to argue that a state represents is to argue that a
state plays a certain role. For the second hand, a representational state has the
content that it does in virtue of standing in some relation to its target. The two
questions, then, are, in virtue of what does a state function as a representation?
and in virtue of what does a given representation have the content that it
has? For the first question, Ramsey answers that a given state counts as
a representation at all because those states are icons—they are models that
comprise constituents that stand in for the objects of representation, and these
icons guide agents in the world via surrogative reasoning. I agree with Ramsey
on this question. For the second question, there are two broad options that, at
this point, I’m indifferent between. The first option that Ramsey recommends
is that representations stand in familiar causal–informational relations to their
targets. On this option, a given representation may count as a representation
in virtue of, e.g., having a model-like structure with constituents that stand
in for various aspects of reality, and those constituents stand for what they
do in virtue of their causal connections to their targets. The second option is
also familiar—what I’ll call natural teleology.21 On this option, an icon has
the particular content that it does in virtue of the use to which a cognitive
system puts it. In what follows, I’m going to explore the teleology option.
To show that iconic propositions represent intrinsically and determinately,
we show that iconic content can be “run” in a cognitive system that lacks
21. See [McGinn 1989] for the phrase. See also [Cummins 1996] and the work of
Ruth Millikan, e.g., [Millikan 2002].
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any kind of interpretative intelligence, yet the use to which the icons are
put, in addition to isomorphism, underwrites the icons’ representative powers.
Ramsey calls this the “mindless strategy” and illustrates it with a two-step
analogy [Ramsey 2007, §6.1]. The first step involves an intelligent agent’s
interpretation conferring representative powers upon an icon; the second step
involves removing the agent while keeping the guiding function of the icon,
the result being that its representational capacity still remains. The analogy
compares the iconic view with another prominent view of representation—the
“receptor view”—in which neural states represent because they reliably detect
certain external conditions. To illustrate:
Step one. Two windowless cars, car A and B, respectively, traverse an
“S”-shaped path. They do so as follows:
– Icon. A driver guides the car with a model of the “S” combined with dead
reckoning (estimating direction and distance to then calculate estimated
location while traveling).
– Receptor. When the car approaches a wall, sensors on the front bumper
push inward, closing a circuit, which illuminates a light, which the driver
uses to guide the car through path.
Step two. Now we remove the drivers, and the cars traverse the path as
follows:
– Icon. The model is replaced with an “S”-shaped groove, isomorphic
to the track, in which a rudder runs. The rudder moves along the
groove and controls the steering wheel via arms connected to the rudder,
guiding the car through the path.
– Receptor. When the car approaches a wall, sensors on the front bumper
push inward, closing a circuit, which controls a rod that pushes the
steering wheel in the opposite direction, which guides the driverless car
through path.
Once we remove the driver, the most natural way to interpret the process
in the receptor car is that a mere causal process guides the car. There is
no component of the process—the sensors, the circuit, the rod—that seems
representational. On the other hand, the best way to explain the success
of car A in step two is that the groove is a model, a representation, of the
track. At some much, much more complicated level, the iconic representations
that guide our behavior are analogous to the groove, and the conclusion that
Ramsey draws, that I want to employ, is that our cognitive systems can
mindlessly use iconic representations to target aspects of reality, and in so
doing, the icons acquire their representational powers.
Natural teleology can solve another problem for the iconic content—that
such content is indeterminate. This is perhaps one of the most obvious worries
for any theory of representation based on isomorphism or similarity. The worry
is that a single iconic representation can target any object—as Fodor puts it
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(tweaked for our purposes) one model may represent a chess game or the Six
Day War if, at some level of abstraction, the two targets are functionally
identical. The source of this objection comes from thinking about everyday
models as well as scientific models. We’re familiar with, at least before the
days of Google Maps, scrawling a map of one’s neighborhood that could serve
to represent any number of things given the right purpose. But everyday
and scientific models, maps, etc., require interpretation from us—they only
extrinsically represent. However, if we pair such iconic representations with
a use to which they are put, then we do get a unique content. We wouldn’t
be impressed if, in the midst of discussing directions via my hand-drawn map
of my neighborhood, someone objected that my map represents Napoleon’s
strategy in the Battle of Austerlitz. Natural teleology performs a similar
purpose except that the “interpretation”—or the use to which it’s put—isn’t
extrinsic, and this use can pin down what an iconic representation represents.22
This determination of content also resolves another immediate worry for
the theory: The representation relation should be typically asymmetric, for
the objects of representations don’t represent their representers. Language-
like representation obviously satisfy this desiderata. I’ve grounded the
representational capacity of my propositions partially in terms of a kind of
similarity, in particular a kind of isomorphism. Yet similarity is a symmetric
relation. If this is the case, then I face an objection: If iconic proposition p
represents r, then r will also represent p, which seems strange at the very
least. The solution is this: Iconic propositions and their targets may be
symmetrically isomorphic, but the targets of such propositions aren’t put to
any use and so don’t represent anything.
Q3. The last decision point is a priority issue. Iconic propositions may
not encode the entirety of an agent’s mental state at some time. Still, such
propositions can encode lots of information. Yet at the very least, to give a
sketch of a theory of propositions, we need individualized propositions. Let’s
first consider, at an intuitive level, how we may extract such propositions.
If the content of an agent’s mental state with respect to some issue at some
particular time is a complex, holistic model, then an individualized proposition
will be some part of that model. Just as a map may represent some expanse of
land, some portion of that map represents a part of that land. More abstractly,
a Venn diagram may represent various properties and relations between sets
as a whole and particular relations and properties when we consider an aspect
22. King’s syntactic–semantic facts require human interpretation to endow syntac-
tic concatenation with the semantic significance without which the facts wouldn’t
intrinsically and determinately represent. King first introduced this interpretative
element [King 2007, chap. 2]. As noted, any kind of map, diagram, etc., represents
extrinsically, and without interpretation, doesn’t represent anything at all. Since I’m
sketching an M1 theory, the mind is the ultimate source of representation, and mental
use and interpretation endows the propositions of this sketch with determinate,
intrinsic content.
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of the diagram—that, e.g., the intersection of two sets is non-empty. In both
of these cases, the holistic representation has priority over the less holistic
representation—the intersection, e.g., only represents what it does in virtue
of its function in the overall diagram. If we can understand a mental model
as a complex property of having a certain pattern of relations—one that a
cognitive system uses to target, via isomorphism, some aspect of reality—then
an individualized content will be some portion of that mental model. In other
words, it will still be a property of having a certain pattern of relations, but the
pattern of relations will be some portion of the agent’s more holistic content.
This just-mentioned property will officially figure into the statement of the
theory below, but I want to flag that I am about to discuss possible worlds
precisifications of this property. There is an unfortunate double use of the
world “model”: mental models and scientific models. These precisifications
are scientific models.
The process of extracting individualized contents from holistic content
isn’t new, especially for possible worlds theorists such as David Lewis.23
And there is, in fact, a close connection between possible worlds and iconic
representation.24 Here is a typical strategy: give a functionalist pairing of sets
of possible worlds with mental states the content of which are mental models.
Consider as an example my iconic representation of the university library.25
The relevant iconic content may be a highly complex, albeit incomplete, model
of the library. Now one aspect of this content is that I represent the world in
such a way that the logic books at the university library are near the middle
of the twentieth floor. The way that we would extract this content from my
holistic model according to the above strategy is that given my desire to check
out a logic book (for example), if the aspect of my model regarding the logic
books is accurate, then it would successfully steer my behavior to satisfy my
desire. We can then pair possible worlds with iconic mental states such that
if a given world were actual, then the agent’s desires would be satisfied by
the actions caused by the iconic mental state. Again, this set of worlds is the
theorist’s tool for precisifying, out of my holistic content, a single aspect of
it that corresponds to what we might specify with a sentence. For the sake
of stating the theory in the next paragraph, let’s say that there is a content
pairing between a holistic content and an individualized content when in fact
there is such a pairing on a process like the one I just described.
Statement of theory. To recap: According to the mind-first trend, the
fundamental source of representation is the mind upon which all others
forms of representation, including propositions, are derivative. The mind-first
movement requires us to pay attention to the details of mental representation.
Toward this end, we’ve considered a diverse view according to which the mind
represents partially iconically. Iconic representations represent not only in
23. Lewis gives four options to extract individualized content [Lewis 1986, 32–34].
24. Mental models theorists, Johnson-Laird in particular, have used possible worlds
to precisify mental models.
25. See [Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson 2007, 190–191] for this analysis.
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virtue of isomorphism, but also, according to the option we took, in virtue
of a cognitive system’s natural teleology—a kind of use that doesn’t require
inner homunculi—that delivers a determinate content for the system. I’ve
understood an isomorphism between mind and the world as the sharing of a
pattern of relations, and I’ve considered the property of having some particular
pattern of relations as a way of specifying that content. We’ve then considered
aspects of that highly complex property that are an individualized content,
and we’ve sketched different ways to precisify that individualized content.
With this in hand, we can now give a statement of the sketch that we’ll refine
and expand upon:
Iconic Propositions (IP) An iconic representation c (a mental map, model,
diagram, etc.) is a complex pattern of relations that form an isomorph
that a cognitive system uses to navigate the world. The content of c is
the property i of having the pattern of relations involved in the isomorph.
An iconic proposition p is a property r that isolates an aspect of i for
which there is a content pairing with i, and the mind represents the world
veridically in terms of p when both the mind and world instantiate r.
Q4. I first consider how the sketch deals with basic issues, which will set us
up to discuss the more complex, contemporary issues.
General content. Can iconic propositions represent anything general? If
they couldn’t, I wouldn’t take that as a damning objection. We would still
have a software-level process that leads to non-general content for which we
should still account. But I think iconic propositions can represent general
facts, and the focus on concrete-style maps may lead one to think otherwise.
For example, diagrammatic content, in my view, represents general facts—e.g.,
a diagram may represent that all dogs are mammals, which isn’t about any
particular dog or mammal.
The claim that icons are always specific has the most force in the context
of depiction in the aesthetics literature. The claim is much less plausible in
the cognitive psychological literature on mental models and maps. As noted,
mental models are not egocentric visual images. A cognitive system may use a
model to navigate some particular task, say getting a particular book from the
library, or an agent might model the general structure of a building type. For
example, there is a particular layout for apartment buildings in the city that
I used to live—all the building generally had the same spatial layout. If I use
the same abstract structure to navigate all such buildings, then that structure
is in some sense general.
Note, however, that here I need not take a stand. Even if iconic mental
representations are always specific in their representation, this is not fatal to
my project in this paper. My goal is to provide an account of propositions
for the modality of iconic mental representation should such representation
exist. I shouldn’t take a stand, at this point, on the nature of these cognitive
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representations, whether they be always specific or sometimes general. If we
take the M1 movement to heart, and we need different propositions for different
modes of representation, and one of those modes ends up having only specific
content, then so be it. If this ends up being the case, and the reader finds this
project overly narrow, then that is really a worry for the M1 movement, and
it is not my intention to mount a defense of M1.
Misrepresentation. There is no representation without misrepresentation,
and there is some disagreement about how misrepresentation works among
those that write about iconic representation.26 Misrepresentation comes about
from a disconnect between a representation and its target. The disconnect on
the traditional picture is between what an externally existing object describes
and how the world is. For IP, the disconnect comes between the content that
isomorphism and natural teleology fix and how the world is. If, according
to the foregoing sketch, we understand veridical representation in terms of
the co-instantiation of properties—the mind and the world both instantiating
the property of having a certain pattern of relations—then it’s natural to
understand misrepresentation as the asymmetric instantiation of properties.
But the world instantiates all kinds of properties that the mind doesn’t
instantiate, and in many cases we don’t want to say that we’re misrepresenting
the world. Misrepresentation, for IP, is a disconnect between the fixed content
of an icon plus natural teleology and how the world is—a disconnect between
an “intended” target and the actual target. This idea should be familiar
on the analogy with everyday iconic content. We may intend to model a
certain part of a neighborhood for directions to a party but misrepresent
the streets, or intend to capture family relations with a diagram and
misrepresent those relations, etc.
Non-existant relata. A necessary condition on the satisfaction of many
relations is that the relata of that relation exist. If the loving relation
obtains between Abélard and Heloïse, then both need to exist. Not so for
representation. Agents can represent the nonexistent: E.g., I can represent
Pegasus, though such a being is nonexistent. It’s important to note that
accounting for non-existent entities, properties, etc., implicated in a relatum
of the representation is a general problem. Here is how IP makes sense of this:
The mind instantiates a property that the relevant chunk of reality does not
instantiate. The reason that a given simulation represents some non-reality is
because that’s the use the cognitive system puts the model to.
Shareability of content. The way that IP accounts for the shareability of
content is perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of the theory in my view.
Above, in the midst of stating the theory, we considered how the propositions
of IP come to have determinate content rather than representing anything
given the right purpose. Considering the key desiderata of shared content will
give me a chance to elaborate on the determinacy issue.
26. See [Cummins 1996] for a detailed view.
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It appears to me that some philosophers take the notion of shared content
quite literally. When two people believe the same thing, the content of the
states is literally one and the same abstract object—the proposition. Similarly
for natural language sentences. This is the case for tuple theories as well as
possible worlds theories: You and I both believe that snow is white in virtue
of our mental states having literally one and the same proposition expressed,
whether it be 〈W, s〉 or the set of snow-is-white worlds, etc. Some modern
writers hold to this literal picture, for example [Schiffer 2003]. Traditionally,
then, to share content is to glom onto one and the same object.
It’s not clear to me, since Soames and King don’t address these issues
directly, how we should understand their vision of shared content. It seems
to me that Soames’ picture must be different, for when you and I believe the
same thing it is in virtue of doing the same thing on his picture: When you
and I both believe that Rachel reads, we both predicate the property of being
a reader to Rachel (and are disposed to that predication in a committal way).
Though we engage in separate act tokens, both of our tokens are of the same
predicative act type. This mutual participation in the same act type should,
in my view, make sense of shared content on Soames’ theory.27
IP diverges from the traditional picture of shared content. My notion of
shared content consists in a notion of sharing that we’re familiar with—that
of properties. Various minds will process information in different ways, but,
when they represent the world as being one way or another, they do so in
virtue of an agents’ iconic contents representing it as such. What these minds
share is that, at some level of abstraction, they’re all similar—both with each
other and with the object of representation. And they’re all similar because
they all instantiate the same property—a sample (or attempted sample) of the
world. So when agents share content, it’s not in virtue of accessing the same
object but in virtue of being relevantly similar to one another.
One may worry that iconic representation is a poor basis for mind-first
propositions because it just seems that mental maps, models, and others kinds
of iconic representation are just too variegated from person to person to ground
any notion of shared content. I think there is something to this worry, but
I think it is a general worry for the mind-first program, which I want to quickly
address.
The worry is that since M1 theorists base their propositions on actual
mental processes, minor differences in those processes may hinder our ability
to give an account of shared content. For Soames, e.g., we may consider how
acts are individuated. It seems plausible that if we take a series of actions,
and rearrange the order of those actions, then the result is two act tokens that
27. It’s unclear how to understand King on this issue. I would want to know more
about how King understands the nature of the syntax in his theory. If his syntax is
idealized psychology, then I think we should understand his notion of shared content
in a way similar to Soames’.
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don’t fall under the same type.28 But if this is the case, then trivial differences
in act order will result in different propositions when what we want is shared
content. For example, suppose you and I are watching a subtitled foreign news
broadcast, and the following line flashes on the screen:
(5) Fighting in Aleppo intensified, and Turkey entered the Syrian conflict
today.
I read the sentence normally, from left to right, and someone blocks your view
so that you read the conjuncts out of order. We both come to believe the same
thing, and although the actions involved in either of our act tokens were the
same, they were performed in different orders, resulting in different act types
and thus different propositions. Soames’ account, because of this temporal
aspect, is especially vulnerable to the worry underway—that minor differences
in the basis of M1 propositions will lead to distinct propositions when we want
the same proposition. For example, the series of actions in processing pIf p,
qq may be different from pq if pq though we would plausibly want the same
proposition here.29
For King, we don’t have this worry since there is no temporal aspect
to the order in which semantic values, given some syntactic structure, are
composed. Yet for King, much depends on exactly what the syntactician
and semanticist are up to at a metaphysical level. While there is a strain
of semanticists that see themselves as describing a Platonic grammar, many
semanticists and syntacticians see themselves, if only implicitly, as modeling
psychological processes at some level of abstraction. If King’s basis of content
consists in psychological models of mental processes, then there are possibly
minor differences in the way that minds calculate linguistic content.
These are complicated issues, but my point in bringing them up is that
accounting for the sharing of content is a general kind of difficulty for the
M1 theorist, and IP doesn’t face a distinctly threatening version of it. At some
level of detail, individual iconic representations will surely differ from brain to
brain. But if a crowd of people have mental models that all represent the logic
books as on the twentieth floor of the library, then there will be some property
based on that representation that all of their minds instantiate, and they will
share content in virtue of that. If anything, IP fares especially well with
28. Soames doesn’t discuss whether he’s committed to this individuation of acts,
but the individuation conditions seem extremely plausible to me. If I go to the store
and then go to the bar, and you go to the same bar and then the store, we seem to
engage in separate acts.
29. An anonymous reviewer made the interesting suggestion that, on Soames’
account, a proposition only consists in the final mental action. At the time of
this writing, Soames’ most recent work, in my view, suggests otherwise. Just one
example: “That is the idea behind propositions as purely representational cognitive
acts or operations, or sequences of such. In the simplest case, the act is predicating a
property of an object. More complex propositions are more complex acts or sequences,
but the idea is the same” [Soames 2015, 20].
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the dilemma currently under discussion because the notion of sharing is the
familiar notion from the sharing of properties. Many red objects can differ in
innumerable ways, and may even differ in their exact shade of redness, yet they
may all share the property of being red. Similarly for iconic representation:
many minds may vary in exactly how they represent some given fact, but they
can still all share a property in common.
Logical relations. The idea of truth or satisfaction conditions starts from
the idea of simulating a fact that obtains. Now this might not fit the
mold of traditional truth conditions, but this isn’t a worry: We need some
understanding of what it means for the content of someone’s mental state to
be accurate, and IP gives us that in terms of property co-instantiation. And we
can begin to understand the logical relations that exist among mental contents
in terms of properties; one can’t model something’s being maroon without
modeling its being red, one can’t model a square’s having three sides, etc.,
which means that certain kinds of properties instantiate together, some can’t
co-instantiate, etc. And given that much of the iconic representation literature,
mental models in particular, was introduced to account for reasoning, much
of that literature can be worked into an account of the logical relations that
hold among mental contents.
The Benacerraf problem. The Benacerraf problem arises, to recall, when we
have multiple propositional candidates to choose among, the choice of which is
arbitrary. This problem is most salient when we have multiple formal objects
with the right propositional properties, such as grain and structure. This
is the classic propositional version of the problem that plagues set theoretic
theories of propositions. IP identifies propositions with properties, not formal
devices. The decision to employ such formal devices is what leads to the
surfeit of choices. If IP had a Benacerraf problem, it would arise from the
indeterminacy of the mental representations—if we had no way of choosing
which of any iconic content may represent some way the world is because
any icon can represent anything with the right interpretation. If this were the
case, then to choose one icon over another would be arbitrary. But we provided
one way of pinning down unique content, which would prevent a Benacerraf
problem of this kind.
4 Conclusion
This paper has been but a first step to fill out the consequences of the change
in propositional theorizing that King and Soames have initiated. I have not
argued for this change directly, only having assumed it. If we are to take
this change seriously, then it calls for propositional theorizing that pays close
attention to the empirical details of mental representation. This paper has
attempted to begin this in the context of non-linguistic representation. The
idea that iconic formats express propositions is not new, but theorists in this
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area have worked to show that propositions express propositions at all [e.g., as
mentioned Grzankowski 2015]. I’ve begun to fill out what the nature of these
propositions might be in the context of mental representation.
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